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Abstract
This paper analyzes the use of neutrality conditions, such as capital export neutral-
ity, capital import neutrality, capital ownership neutrality, and market neutrality,
in international tax policy. Neutralities are not appropriate tools for designing tax
policy. They each identify a possible margin where taxation may distort business
activities. Because these neutralities cannot be all satisfied simultaneously, how-
ever, they do not allow analysts to determine the appropriate trade-offs of these
distortions, unlike deadweight loss measures used in other areas of tax policy. In-
ternational tax policy should instead be tied directly to the reasons for taxing
capital income, reasons which are derived from optimal tax or similar models.
Keywords: International taxation, capital export neutrality, capital import neu-
trality, ownership neutrality, optimal taxation
Since Richman (1963), a standard way to analyze international tax policy
is by reference to whether the tax system meets a specified neutrality con-
dition. Richman argued that tax systems should be capital export and/or
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capital import neutral. Feldstein & Hartman (1979) argued that from a sin-
gle nation’s perspective, the tax system should strive for national neutrality.
Desai & Hines (2003, 2004) and Hines (2008) proposed capital ownership
neutrality as yet another alternative. Devereux (2008) has argued for market
neutrality.
In the domestic tax context, neutrality plays a limited role. It is most
often invoked in the context of tax rates on different types of capital income.
For example, the tax system is not neutral as to housing and intellectual
property compared to machines. Although studies making these sorts of
claims may be motivated by facially non-neutral taxation, they ultimately
use deadweight loss measures, as their tool for determining the effects of
unequal taxation and how to design tax systems (e.g., Auerbach (1989),
Fullerton & Lyon (1988)).
I wish to explore here what accounts for the use of neutralities in the
international tax context and whether this approach is desirable.1 I consider
three possible accounts of the use of international tax neutralities. The first
is that one or more of these neutralities is actually the correct way to think
about international tax policy. The second is that one or more of these neu-
tralities, while not fully correct, acts as a reasonable rule of thumb for policy
making. The third is that language in papers purporting to use neutralities is
loose talk, and that the best studies of international taxation do not actually
use neutralities.
I reject the first two accounts, that neutralities are the correct way to ap-
proach international taxation or are a reasonable rule of thumb. Neutralities
identify a single margin of distortion among many. For example, capital ex-
port neutrality demands that the location of investments not be distorted. It
does not, therefore, allow a trade-off of location distortions with other distor-
tions, such as to ownership or to patterns of savings. Tax policy, particularly
in the international tax context, however, requires balancing different poten-
tial distortions. This requires deadweight loss measures, not neutralities. The
last account, that much modern scholarship on international tax systems has
effectively abandoned the use of neutralities, is, I believe, reasonably close to
correct, although performing a head count is not straightforward.
Scholarship on international tax systems, however, still does not resem-
1 The arguments made here are in addition to and complimentary the criticisms of
capital export and import neutrality made by Graetz (2000) and Grubert & Altshuler
(2008).
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ble scholarship on domestic tax systems. Because international taxation is
largely about the taxation of capital income, scholarship on international tax-
ation often takes the taxation of capital income as given. Moreover, it usually
takes firm-level taxation as given. I will suggest here that there are profitable
opportunities to make the study of international taxation look more like the
study of domestic taxation, basing the design of the system for taxing capital
income in the international context on the principles for why we might want
to tax capital income in the first place. As emphasized by Graetz (2000), the
best way to make international tax policy is by setting forth the social goal
and determining the best set of trade-offs for achieving it given the tools and
information available.
1 International Taxation and Neutralities
The use of neutralities to evaluate international tax policy is attributed to
Richman (1963). She focuses on two types of neutralities: capital export
neutrality and capital import neutrality.
Capital export neutrality (CEN) requires residents of any given nation to
face the same tax burden no matter where they choose to invest. That way,
investors choose the location of their investments based on where they can
get the highest pre-tax return. For example, a British investor considering
investments in France, the US, China, or at home, should choose the location
that brings the highest pre-tax returns. Imposing the same tax rate regardless
of location helps ensure this condition is met. Capital export neutrality
is thought to support either a purely residence-based system or worldwide
source-based taxation with an unlimited foreign tax credit.
Capital export neutrality tries to identify conditions under which invest-
ment is allocated efficiently. Capital import neutrality (CIN), by contrast,
is about savings. It requires that all investments in a given country pay the
same marginal rate of tax regardless of the residence of the investor. This
means that all business activity within a country is subject to the same over-
all level of taxation. If capital import neutrality holds, all savers receive the
same after-tax return, regardless of their residence, which means that the
allocation of savings is efficient. CIN is thought to support taxation by the
source country with the residence country exempting foreign source income.
Feldstein & Hartman (1979) are associated with a norm sometimes called
national neutrality (NN). The claim is that from a national perspective, it
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is optimal to tax foreign source income but allow a deduction for foreign
taxes the same way we allow a deduction for other costs. A tax system
with this feature will make investors indifferent between the pre-tax return
on domestic investments and the return on foreign investments after paying
foreign taxes. The key difference between CEN and NN is the treatment
of foreign taxes: CEN treats a foreign government receiving taxes the same
as the home country government receiving taxes while NN counts only tax
payments to the home country as improving welfare. The argument for NN is
that countries will not be indifferent between their own government receiving
tax revenues and some other governing receiving that money.
Desai & Hines (2003, 2004) introduced an alternative neutrality, capital
ownership neutrality (CON). Capital ownership neutrality demands that tax-
ation not influence who owns assets. The theory is based on a finding that
ownership of assets affects their productivity. To maximize productivity,
taxation should not distort the ownership patterns that would arise absent
taxation. A variety of tax systems meet this requirement, including systems
that exempt foreign income from taxation.
Devereux’s market neutrality (MN) is a generalization of this concept.
Devereux (2008). It requires that if two firms compete with each other in the
same market, they should face the same overall effective tax rates on their
investments. For example, if an American firm and a British firm compete
with each other in Canada, the two firms should face the same effective tax
rate so that taxation does not distort the competition.
A central feature of international tax policy is that the policy choice is
framed as picking one of the competing neutralities. As is well known, unless
tax rates and the tax base are the same in all countries, it is impossible to
achieve both capital export and capital import neutrality at the same time.
Because they are incompatible, tax policy is sometimes thought to involve
choosing among them. For example, Griffith et al. (2008), in a review of
the international tax policy literature state that when “tax rates are not
harmonized so that a choice between the two forms of neutrality has to be
made, it has usually been argued that from a global perspective, CEN should
take precedence of CIN . . .” (emphasis added) Graetz (2000, p. 272) reports,
“many economists regard the choice between CEN and CIN as essentially
empirical, turning on the relative elasticities of savings and investment. Since
investment is thought to be more responsive to changes in levels of taxation, a
policy of CEN predominates.” (emphasis added) Desai & Hines (2003) argue
CON should be used instead of CEN.
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This sort of reasoning – international tax policy as a choice among neutral-
ities – is widely used in international tax discussions. Studies by government
agencies such as the US Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, reg-
ularly rely on capital export neutrality (e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation
(1999) and Treasury (2000)). The legal literature on international tax policy
routinely uses these norms.2 Even academic studies that reject CEN use it
as a starting point for discussion (e.g., Devereux et al. (2013)).
The puzzle that motivates this paper is that this approach – a digital
choice of efficiency goals – is not how domestic tax issues are approached.
In the domestic context, tax theory usually proceeds by explicitly stating a
normative goal, usually an aggregation the utility of a set of individuals, and
by making assumptions about the information available to the government.
The tax system is then derived from these assumptions. For example, ap-
proaches based on Mirrlees (1971) maximize a function of individual utility,
specifying the distribution of relevant attributes among individuals and the
information available to the government. The decision to tax capital income
and the design of a tax on capital income is derived from this setup, such as
in recent work like, Piketty & Saez (2013) and Golosov et al. (2013).
Many studies analyzing the effects of existing law focus on the different
tax rates that apply to different types of investment. For example, it is rou-
tine to note that investments in housing are largely exempt from tax, that
the immediate deduction for the creation of intellectual property effectively
exempts such investments from tax, and that different rates of depreciation
for different types of assets can generate distortions. The idea that a tax on
capital income should be neutral across different types of capital income lies
behind these claims. Nevertheless, when thinking about tax system design,
the key measure is the deadweight loss from differential capital income taxa-
tion. The question is why international tax policy often proceeds differently
and whether it should continue to do so.
2 Possible reasons for the use of neutralities in
international taxation
I consider three hypotheses for the use of neutralities in the international tax
policy context.
2 Graetz (2000) has a large number of citations to both government studies, economics
literature, and legal literature which rely on one or more international tax neutralities.
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2.1 Are one or more neutralities correct?
The first possibility is that one of the proposed neutralities is the correct
way to think about the issue, so that international tax policy should involve
picking the right one. CEN or CIN or CON or NN or MN, for example, might
maximize national or global welfare (or both). This possibility, however, is
unlikely.
Each of the proposed neutralities, taken on its own has been subject
to significant criticisms in large part because the models used to support
them contain strong simplifying assumptions which, while useful for clarifying
thinking and for modeling purposes, do not hold generally. For example,
CEN has been criticized by Keen & Wildasin (2004) as not holding unless
governmental budgets are linked through a system of international transfers.
Keen & Piekkola (1997) argue that if governments cannot tax away all profits,
the optimal tax system will not be consistent with CEN or CIN; it will be a
compromise between CEN and CIN. Horst (1980) argues that if the supply as
well as the demand for capital varies with the rate of return, neither CEN nor
CIN is optimal. Desai & Hines (2003, p. 493) criticize CEN as assuming that
foreign firms do not respond to changes induced by home-country taxation.
Graetz (2000, p. 287) criticizes CEN, among other reasons, as failing to
consider the reasons for foreign direct investment, such as economies of scale
or scope that allow successful businesses to exploit opportunities worldwide
rather than just domestically. Grubert & Altshuler (2013) note that CEN
and CIN rely on special assumptions and also do not provide guidance on
many important international tax issues such as the taxation of royalties.
Capital ownership neutrality is newer and therefore, has been less well
criticized but it is not consistent with more complete models of international
investment. For example, Becker & Fuest (2010) and Devereux et al. (2013)
find that CON only holds under specialized assumptions about management
capacity to expand when a firm acquires another firm. Desai and Hines
themselves agree that CON may not hold when the location of plant, equip-
ment, and other productive factors is mobile between countries in response
to tax rate differences. As they note, if factors of production are mobile, and
respond to tax rate differentials, “tax systems then determine the location
of production as well as patterns of ownership and control, so the net effect
of taxation on global welfare depends on the sum of these effects.” Desai &
Hines (2003, p. 495)
There is, however, a more central problem than the particulars of each
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proposed neutrality. Even if we take it as a given that each identifies an
important set of trade-offs, we should not think of tax policy involving a
choice of which neutrality works best. Each type of neutrality identifies a
particular margin that international capital taxation may distort. Unless we
are in a setting where all but one type of inefficiency is absent, tax policy
should try to find the mix of inefficiencies that is least costly.
To perform this sort of analysis, however, we need dead weight loss mea-
sures not neutralities. Neutralities are not like deadweight loss. Small taxes
create small deadweight losses and as taxes increase, deadweight losses in-
crease. Knowing this allows us to consider the design of the tax system,
trading off different deadweight losses or deadweight losses for other goals
such as compliance costs. Neutralities lack this basic feature. They tell us
that there might be deadweight loss but do not tell us how much there is.
For example, Desai & Hines (2003) emphasize that ownership is impor-
tant to the productivity of assets and conclude that we should pursue owner-
ship neutrality rather than export neutrality. They treat the neutralities as
either/or propositions. If they instead approached the problem using a dead-
weight loss measure, they would likely have argued that if we cannot avoid
distortions in both ownership and the location of investments, we should
design the tax system so that the marginal efficiency loss on each of these
margins is equal. While at points they recognize this trade-off, they frame
their approach as a choice of one or the other type of neutrality.
Another reason why neutralities are not an appropriate way to think
about international taxation is that there is no necessary connection be-
tween the various neutralities and the reasons for taxation. Optimal tax
theory considers the design of the tax system by direct reference to the social
maximand, the distribution of ability or related attributes in the population,
and the underlying information constraints facing the government. If the
reasons for taxation differ, the preferred design of the tax system responds.
Neutralities do not respond this way. They are flat out commands that bear
only an indirect connection to the reasons for taxation.
In particular, most international tax policy involves the taxation of capital
income, most often at the firm level. To design the taxation of cross-border
capital flows we need to know the reason why we are taxing capital income
in the first place and why we are doing so at the firm level. If, for example,
optimal tax considerations show that we should not be taxing capital income
(or that we should exempt the normal return to capital), the design of the
international tax system is relatively straightforward and does not require
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the use of neutralities.
If on the other hand, there are reasons for taxing capital income, we need
to specify what those are and design the taxation of international capital flows
to match those reasons. I will suggest some directions that this approach
may take in part 3. To peak ahead, suppose that a reason for taxing capital
income is that it is a complement to leisure. Different types of capital income,
including income located in different jurisdiction or invested through different
types of investment vehicles might be differentially complementary to leisure.
Neutralities of various sorts would not be desired, or if they are desirable they
would arise out of an empirical claim about complementarity to leisure, not
out of a priori reasoning.
Similarly, if we tax the return to savings because savings are an indicator
of ability (as suggested in Saez (2002)), different forms of savings might indi-
cate different levels of ability. Perhaps domestic savings indicates mid-level
ability, savings in developed foreign nations indicates high ability, and man-
aging to diversify savings to developing nations indicates very high ability.
The optimal tax would follow. Or if this entirely made up empirical conjec-
ture is false and all savings are equal indicators of ability, the optimal tax
might meet a neutrality condition.
The basic point is that we cannot know what the optimal pattern of
international capital income taxation should be without understanding the
reasons for taxing capital income in the first place. Using neutralities does
not allow us to make these determinations.
Similarly, much international tax policy considers firm-level taxation. To
understand the design of firm-level taxation, however, we need to know why
we are taxing firms. Firm-level taxation, for example, does not permit dif-
ferentiation of tax rates by investor. Tax systems that require differentiation
will either not use firm-level taxation or will use it as a preliminary with-
holding system rather than an end in and of itself. How one views the role
of firm-level taxation will in part determine the taxation of cross-border cash
flows by firms.
It is hard to prove a negative, so the arguments above are not a proof that
a neutrality approach cannot, under some circumstances, provide the correct
guidance for designing an international tax system. Nevertheless, given the
basic problems with any such approach, it seems unlikely.
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2.2 Neutralities as rules of thumb
One possible defense of using neutralities is that international tax policy is
so hard and takes place under such severe constraints that we need simple
rules of thumb to guide policy making. Perhaps one of the neutralities is
close enough to optimal to provide reasonable guidance in a complex policy-
making environment. In addition, a simple rule might provide a focal point
for coordination by multiple nations.
Consider the setting for international tax policy. The basic domestic tax
system is most often taken as fixed. It is usually assumed to tax capital
income (including the normal return to capital) at the same nominal rate as
labor income, using the realization system and some sort of firm-level tax (but
with different sources of firm financing taxed different ways). International
tax policy is asked what sort of taxation of cross-border flows maximizes
welfare conditional on these assumptions. While first principles approaches
may be useful, real world guidance, one may argue, requires relatively simple
rules that build off of the existing tax system. If policy makers want guidance
on the design of the foreign tax credit system, it does not help to tell them
that they should not be taxing capital income or taxing capital income at
the firm level in the first place.
While work taking this approach is no doubt useful – there is nothing
wrong with a model that is conditional on assumptions about policy choices
– it should not be the only or primary approach to the problem given how
restrictive the assumptions are. Suppose that most academic work instead
approached international taxation from a less restrictive set of assumptions
and found that there were substantial welfare gains from different types of
tax systems. For example suppose that the assumption of taxing the normal
return to capital were relaxed and studies found large welfare gains. To
the extent that this work informs policy making, we would be better off
than if work took the existing framework as fixed. For example, Devereux
et al. (2013) compare optimal tax systems where the international tax system
must tax the normal returns to capital and where it does not. They find that
the assumption that normal returns must be taxed prevents the tax system
from reaching the first best optimum in the allocation of capital. As will be
discussed in detail below, Auerbach et al. (2008) and Griffith et al. (2008)
come to similar conclusions, although for different reasons. If conclusions like
this hold up, restricting international tax policy discussions to rules of thumb
built on the existing tax system may lead to substantial welfare losses.
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Moreover, even if it is important to provide guidance that takes much
or most of the existing tax system as given (which I believe to be true),
neutralities are not likely to be good rules of thumb. The reason is that the
existing tax system distorts along many margins. Neutralities pick a single
margin and require that the distortions along that margin be eliminated
instead of allowing trade-offs along all of the margins effected by existing
law. Good rules of thumb need to identify the relevant trade-offs and provide
measurements of the size of the effects.
2.3 Loose Language
The final possibility is that neutralities are not really used in the best studies
of international tax policy. Even if neutralities are mentioned, the discussion
is just a ritual incantation before the real work begins. If one examines
recent work closely, much of it starts from a model of the problem to be
examined and derives a tax system that optimizes a specified welfare function.
Neutralities are largely extraneous to this work.
As mentioned above, Horst (1980) and Keen & Piekkola (1997) might
be taken as early examples. Both papers find that neither CEN nor CIN
is optimal by using a model of international investment. Becker & Fuest
(2010) is a more recent example examining CON showing that it only holds
under limited conditions. Studies of the effects of tax reform proposals, while
sometimes making reference to neutralities, often try to directly measure the
effects (e.g., Grubert & Altshuler (2013).
The most recent comprehensive review of international tax policy is the
relevant chapters in the Mirrlees Review, (Auerbach et al., 2008) (ADS), and
(Griffith et al., 2008) (GHS). It is worth examining the approach taken in
these chapters in a bit more detail because of their prominence.
ADS provides a good example of the sort of reasoning about international
taxation that can be done without resorting to neutralities. They start by
considering why we might want business level taxes. They list three reasons
(ADS p. 876): (1) it may be less expensive to have corporations remit
taxes than individuals; (2) the base of the tax may be best measured at
the corporate level, such as if the base is rents earned by businesses; and
(3) a corporate level tax may be able to tax foreign investors in domestic
businesses while a pure residence-based tax on individuals cannot. As they
note, however, the role of corporate taxes depends on the characteristics of
the optimal tax system, so they turn to these issues, starting with a closed
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economy and then turning to an open economy.
In a closed economy, if the optimal base is consumption, we may still
want to tax rents and old capital. As a result, ADS say that we may want a
business level tax, but of the consumption sort (although the argument here
is not clear – an individual level consumption tax would also or could also
tax rents and old capital). If the optimal base is capital income, it is easier to
see the role of a business level tax, although the distortions associated with
such a tax need to be taken into account.
These considerations may change considerably in an open economy. The
core claim made by ADS is that even if it is optimal to tax the capital income,
we likely do not want to do so through source-based taxation. They note that
in a small open economy,
[a source-based] tax simply raises the pre-tax required rate of re-
turn and reduces the stock of capital, shifting none of the burden
to foreigners but resulting in more deadweight loss than a tax on
domestic factors that bear the tax.
ADS p. 868. That is, because the after-tax rate of return is determined inter-
nationally, a domestic source-based tax will reduce domestic investment until
the required pre-tax rate of return is sufficient to compensate international
investors. Investors, therefore, are indifferent to the tax. The incidence of
the tax is instead on immobile domestic factors such as labor. A direct tax
on labor would be more efficient as it would not distort investment choices.
ADS conclude, therefore, that if we want a tax on income, we should want
to do so via a tax on residence. In their view, a residence-based income tax
would include returns on outbound investment, treating foreign taxes as an
expense. (p. 869) The residence of individuals is relatively well-defined, and
most individuals are largely immobile, creating administrative advantages.
Because a residence-based tax would not depend on where capital or profit is
located, the location of capital and profit would not be distorted. Moreover,
the incidence would be on investors; the tax would not likely be shifted to
immobile factors such as labor. At the business level, the recommend a
version of a destination-based consumption tax.
GHS discuss neutralities extensively but ultimately their arguments ig-
nore neutralities in favor of concerns similar to those in ADS. Citing Gordon
(1986), they state:
One of the best-known results in the literature on optimal tax
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setting behavior states that in the absence of location-specific re-
turns, a government in a small open economy should not levy any
source-based taxes on capital. . . . the burden of a source-based
capital tax will be fully shifted onto workers and other immobile
domestic factors via an outflow of capital which drives up the
pre-tax return.
The incentive for countries to avoid source-based taxes is, according to GHS,
offset by four factors. First, we may want source-based taxes to capture
location-specific rents. Second, if capital is less than perfectly mobile, some
source-based taxation may be desirable. Third, business-level taxes may be
needed to backstop residence-based labor income taxes, possibly making the
distortions from source-based taxes worth their cost. Finally, they note that
people may simply be confused about the effects of source-based taxes and,
therefore, impose them by mistake.
After considering a number of smaller reforms for the UK, GHS propose
a version of a business-level consumption tax know as ACE (effectively an
income tax with a full allowance for the cost of capital). They base their
arguments explicitly on Gordon (1986). They state that “the theoretical case
for an ACE in an open economy context follows form the analysis that . . .
in a small open economy with near-perfect capital mobility, the burden of a
source-based tax on the normal return to capital will tend to be [more than]
fully shifted onto the less mobile factors of production such as labour and
land.” (p. 974)
When examining the body of literature on international taxation, there-
fore, it is apparent that there is a sizable portion which does not rely on
neutralities and instead directly examines the effects or various tax rules or
tries to develop rules based on their intended purpose and effects. It is pos-
sible that the use of neutralities is simply a ritual and that the real analysis
lies elsewhere.
3 Optimal International Taxation
While the papers discussed immediately above do not rely on neutralities, for
the most part, they do not try to base the design of international tax systems
on first principles. They do not ask why we are taxing capital income in
the first place (or whether we should) and consider how those reasons might
inform the design the international component of the capital income tax. My
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task for this section will be to examine where an approach like this might lead.
To keep the analysis simple, I will assume that the social welfare function is
set to maximize national welfare without considering whether coordination
of tax policy in a repeated game setting mean that nations behave as if they
were maximizing global welfare.
3.1 THE OPTIMAL BASE IS CONSUMPTION
The easiest case to consider is if the optimal tax base is consumption. There
are well known reasons based on Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976), the consid-
erations in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), and the administrative costs
savings highlighted by Andrews (1974) for preferring consumption taxation.
Consumption taxes are relatively well understood in the open economy
context (e.g, Grubert & Newlon (1997); Bradford (2004)). Standard results
include the conclusion that under relatively strict assumptions, origin and
destination-based taxes are the same. If we relax the assumptions, origin
and destination-based taxes may differ with respect to (1) rents; (2) tran-
sition/tax rate changes; (3) tourism, and (4) administrative costs. Finally,
consumption taxes in the open economy context are somewhat less efficient
than in the closed economy context because they can affect discrete location
choices, which depend on average not marginal rates. If discrete location
choices are a concern, a small open economy may not want to impose source-
based taxes at all except to the extent justified by location-specific rents.
Most of the issues analysts attempt to address using neutralities are not
present in a consumption tax context. For example, consumption taxes are
thought not to affect savings rates, location choices, and ownership choices.
Therefore, discussions of international issues in a consumption tax setting do
not generally use neutralities.
3.2 THE OPTIMAL BASE INCLUDES A TAX ON THE NORMAL
RETURN TO CAPITAL
The analysis is considerably more complicated if the optimal base includes
a tax on capital income. To determine the optimal tax structure, we need
to know why the base includes capital income because different rationales, I
will suggest, may have different design implications. There are a number of
reasons why we might want to tax capital income. Sorensen (2007), Banks &
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Diamond (2008), and Diamond & Saez (2011) provide surveys. I will consider
several of the reasons for capital income taxation listed in those sources and
illustrate the potential implications for international taxation.
CAPITAL INCOME AS HIDDEN LABOR INCOME
The first argument raised by Banks & Diamond (2008) is that without a tax
on capital income, taxpayers will be able to avoid the tax on labor income
by relabeling it capital income. For example, most or all of the earnings of
founders of start-up companies is due to their labor effort but may be realized
as capital gains from the sale of the company. A capital income tax, under
this rationale, is necessary to prevent avoidance of the labor income tax.
While I am not sure that this argument is correct - tax systems such
as Bradford’s X-tax are designed precisely to prevent such relabeling - the
argument implies a complex set of trade-offs which are not well understood.
Taxing capital income to prevent relabeling of labor income means taxing
all capital income, not just relabeled income. As a result, we must trade-off
the inefficiencies caused by the tax on non-relabeled capital income (which is
not a desired tax under this rationale) with the avoidance effects that result
if capital income were not taxed. For example, if we tax capital income at
the same rate as the highest labor income tax rate, we would eliminate the
incentive to relabel labor income but this strategy comes at the cost of a
high rate of tax on capital income generally. If we reduce the capital income
tax rate by a small amount, we might not introduce substantial incentives to
relabel but would reduce the efficiency losses from capital income taxation.
Deriving the optimal capital income tax structure would involve complex
trade-offs of this sort.
If capital is mobile internationally, the considerations in Gordon (1986)
would have to be taken into account. We impose a capital cineom tax, under
this rationale, to tax the labor income of the individual who is hiding his
labor income as capital income (e.g., the founder of a new company). If the
burden of capital income taxation, however, falls on labor generally, a capital
income tax may not effectively prevent relabeling. If the after-tax return to
capital is determined by international capital markets, relabeling may be as
attractive with a capital income tax as without.
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NEW DYNAMIC PUBLIC FINANCE ARGUMENTS
The core argument for a capital income tax made in the new dynamic public
finance literature is that savings creates a fiscal externality. People who save
are able to work less in the future, living off of their savings. As a result,
the incentive constraints on the labor income tax are tighter, reducing our
ability to redistribute. A tax on savings can, in these models, be thought of
as a Pigouvian tax on the fiscal externality created by excess savings.
A key question for these arguments is the extent to which the capital
income tax needs to be personalized. In the most sophisticated models,
the tax is highly dependent on the history of each individual’s earnings and
savings. Implementing these systems would require a residence-based tax,
and one with a high level of information about behavior. The disagreements
between ADS and GHS on the feasibility of such a tax would come into play,
although ADS and GHS were considering the feasibility of a conventional
tax on capital income, not the more complex NDPF taxes. It is not clear
whether GHS, who believe residence-based taxes are feasible, would believe
that the sorts of taxes envisioned by the NDPF literature are feasible in a
setting with mobile capital.
Some versions of the NDPF arguments recommend a flat rate tax on cap-
ital income. A conventional residence-based tax may in this case be desirable
and the arguments about its feasibility would apply. A more difficult question
is whether a source-based tax can work. I think in this case that the incidence
arguments in Gordon (1986) and relied up by GHS do not matter. The tax
on capital is like a Pigouvian tax in that it is a tax on an externality-causing
activity. Incidence does not matter; fully pricing the externlity behavior is
what counts. The problem is that a source-based tax would not eliminate the
externality to the extent that individuals invest abroad (and those nations
do not have a tax on capital income or do not have one at the desired rate).3
SAVINGS ARE A SIGNAL OF ABILITY
Saez (2002) argues that we should tax the return to savings because, between
two individuals with the same labor income, the person with more savings
likely has a higher ability. We might think of savings as providing the gov-
3 The NDPF argument provides no reason for taxing inbound investment as a source-
based tax nominally does, but to the extent foreigners actually bear the tax, this is not a
problem as I am assuming that foreigners are not part of the social welfare function.
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ernment with information about ability. The argument is different from the
NDPF argument in that a higher tax on savings is not to relax the incentive
constraints for purposes of the labor income tax. Instead, the tax is simply
to impose a higher burden on those with high utility for a given amount of
labor effort.
The difficulty with using this argument for designing international tax
systems is that Saez only shows that a marginal (i.e., non-zero but infinitely
small) tax on capital is desirable (under his assumption that savings indicates
ability, all else equal). The argument does not, at least yet, support any
significant positive tax. To the extent that it can be read to support a
significant (i.e., bounded away from zero) tax, the incidence issues raised by
Gordon (1986) create problems with implementing it through a source-based
tax. The goal is for the higher ability person to bear a higher burden and
if globalized capital markets prevent this from happening, the goal will be
defeated. The only way to implement Saez’s tax is through a residence-based
tax. That is, the difference between Saez’s proposal and the NDPF proposals
is that Saez’s proposal is directly distributive while the NDPF proposals are
Pigouvian.4 This may make all the difference in tax system design when
capital markets are global.
COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN LEISURE AND FUTURE CONSUMPTION
An important result from optimal taxation is that it may be desirable to tax
complements to leisure more highly than other goods. The argument is that a
labor income or consumption tax shifts the relative price of leisure compared
to other goods, distorting work effort. Although we may not be able to tax
leisure directly, we can impose a higher tax rate on complements to leisure
(and a lower tax rate on substitutes for leisure). The argument is Pigouvian
in that taxing complements to leisure relaxes the incentive constraint. Similar
to the NDPF arguments, therefore, we may not care that the incidence of
the tax is shifted to labor.
CAPITAL-SKILL COMPLEMENTARITY AND ENDOGENOUS FACTOR PRICES
Suppose that skilled labor is more complementary to capital accumulation
than is unskilled labor. Capital accumulation will then tend to raise the
4 They are, of course, indirectly distributive because they relax the incentive constraints
on the labor income tax.
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relative wages of skilled workers. This makes it more attractive for a skilled
worker to mimic an unskilled worker, tightening the incentive constraints on
the labor income tax. The government may therefore want to reduce savings
and capital accumulation through a positive capital income tax.
This argument seems to imply we want source-based taxation. We want
to reduce domestic investment. In a sense, the argument embraces the re-
sult in Gordon (1986). On the other hand, the reason for reducing capital
accumulation is so that the labor income tax can better redistribute. To the
extent a source-based income tax falls on unskilled labor, it may hurt that
goal. It is difficult to speculate on the net effect. The argument would not
seem to support residence-based taxation as residence-based taxation may
not reduce domestic investment.
4 Conclusion
A way to frame the core question I have raised is whether or the extent
to which it is desirable to incorporate optimal tax considerations into the
design of international tax systems in place of more standard assumptions.
Although doing so is a formidable tax, I do not see any other way to pro-
ceed. In particular, if we are to have a tax on capital income, we need to
understand why we want such a tax because different reasons will support
different types of tax systems. Globalization of capital markets and the re-
sulting incidence issues affect some reasons and not others. Some reasons
require residence-based taxes because the rates must be personalized while
others support flat rates. Neutralities, the standard tool of international tax
policy, are not helpful. They are not clearly related to the underlying reasons
for taxing capital. They do not permit of compromise – a decision to tax cap-
ital income means that we knowing are distorting investment choices so the
question is how best to do that given the relevant goals and administrative
concerns.
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